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MRD: The idea for this interview has been 
inspired by your robust research and scholarly 
agenda since your retirement. What is it that 
drives your continued scholarly work? 
EJ: Writing philosophy has always been 
one of my main ways of being alive, of being 
totally present. It’s like playing a team sport in 
that way, where for that time there is nothing 
other than the awareness of the activity - 
where the puck is, who has it, where the play-
ers are. So, too, with doing philosophy. That’s 
all there is: a focus on the idea itself, with the 
qualifications, the objections, the demands 
for clarity, consistency, and completeness - all 
those “players.” I still “keep up”—not as long 
as I once could but, I hazard, as well as I ever 
did. Teaching was that way, too, when a class 
really sang. Though I miss teaching, now I can 
focus my energy more on just the writing itself 
and the engagement with the best reasoners 
in the world. 
MRD: I’m surprised with your answer. I was 
expecting you to identify some problems 
that have been your philosophical muse or 
ongoing public debates about which you hope 
to provide some clarity. But it seems that it is 
scholarly life itself that inspires you. 
EJ: My scholarly engagement is more the 
Platonic quest for a certain kind of sense-
making or discovery, It is open-ended as I  
hope to follow the argument wherever it 
leads, seeking the sense of living in the im-
mediacy of the intellectual quest.
MRD: What I find striking is that the idea that 
what motivates you is the activity of philosoph-
ical writing, and getting lost in it, so to speak, 
and not so much a result you are concerned to 
achieve. But insofar as there is inquiry there 
must be some goal, right? Playing sports, at 
our best we lose ourselves, but still there 
is usually a goal and there are rules which 
govern the sport in question. You’ve mentioned 
some of the “rules,” so to speak, which govern 
your work: concern with clarity, consistency, 
completeness. But what is the desideratum? 
Take your recent paper “Too Soon to Say” 
( Philosophy 2012), which starts as a defense 
of John Rawls from a certain line of criticism, 
but wonderfully—in my mind—contains a 
sustained argument that “disagreement does 
not entail moral epistemic deficiency.” What do 
you mean by this? Why is it important? What’s 
at stake?
EJ: For me, philosophy should focus on the 
issues that we disagree on (for example, the 
existence of God, the meaning of life, the 
proper organization of society), the issues that 
put into question what a good reason is. Often 
when we disagree, what counts as good 
evidence or good reasons is itself part of the 
debate, and we have to critically examine our 
own perspective and assumptions. Because of 
this, philosophers through millennia have had 
logic and critical reasoning in general as a  
primary pursuit. In the essay, “Too Soon to 
Say,” I argue that the criteria we use to carry 
on any inquiry—clarity, consistency, coher-
ence, completeness; call them “the Cs”— 
are internal to an inquiring conversation. 
But while reflective inquiry depends on all of 
these, just what those criteria mean, their 
“weight,” is itself open to question. For me, 
this is why the activity of philosophy is what 
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is central. Whatever arguments we make 
will always be open to serious critique; it will 
always be too soon to say the Last or Best 
Word. And so it is that we develop our ideas, 
taking account of the critiques of others, and 
knowing fully that what we come up with will 
be challenged. To be result oriented is to be 
unaware that we are perpetually engaged in 
a multi-perspective conversation. This is the 
profoundly enriching aspect of philosophy. 
MRD: So when you say “disagreement does 
not entail moral epistemic deficiency” you are 
recognizing that we can never be fully aware 
of all of the resources available in support of 
a given position. And we should thus avoiding 
stigmatizing those who disagree with us. 
EJ: Sometimes when people disagree, it 
leads one party to conclude that the other is 
not just intellectually wrong, but so unrea-
sonable that he is morally wrong. We often 
see this dynamic in political debates, ethical 
debates, and the like. I am concerned with 
the fact that we probably do this too much. 
Moral epistemic deficiency addresses when 
we should rightly criticize someone for being 
culpably wrongheaded in reasoning – e.g., 
in ignoring past arguments, making obvious 
fallacies – and when we should rather hold off 
and recognize the give and take we confront 
all the time in the criteria we use to judge 
what it means to be reasonable. To engage in 
reflective inquiry is to be committed to meet-
ing what I called the Cs. That’s the good news. 
It’s what unites all scholars, from scientists 
to poets, in our work. But what is essential 
to note here, and now the bad news, is that 
November 2015 33
we are in tension, both among ourselves 
and often within ourselves, as individuals, 
as to how the Cs are to be understood and 
prioritized. In philosophy, we have in the field 
of political thought, say, the question of how 
best to evaluate a government or a society. Do 
we prioritize equality (as would liberals), lib-
erty (libertarians), excellence (Aristotelians), 
harmony (Confucians), divine command, 
ecological or environmental balance? The list 
goes on. Each one of these, and indeed, each 
version of these, has strengths and weakness-
es with respect to the Cs. For starters, each 
one is initially incomplete from the perspec-
tive of the others and seeks either to show the 
others how it can include their values or why it 
should exclude their values when considering 
political organization. 
MRD: Your two points blend together nicely. 
Philosophical inquiry focuses both on the 
activity of sense-making or discovery, and 
a concern to recognize that the criteria that 
govern inquiry are, to some degree, fluid. They 
seem to work together to hopefully produce 
both an epistemic humility and a willingness  
to continue the inquiry.
EJ: And I would draw from this a radical 
conclusion. Too often, philosophers (myself 
included) have viewed philosophy as politics 
by other means. In this vein, philosophy has 
had an essentially combative side to it – a 
feeling that it is important to “win” the argu-
ment, to advance one’s cause. But if sense 
making is truly coupled with epistemic humil-
ity, then what is important is not to win the 
argument but to carry the discussion further in 
the light of that uncertainty. This might sound 
tame, but it is not, for it calls for a new view 
of philosophic citizenship, where philosophy 
has the political aim of keeping the inquiring 
conversation going and keeping the standards 
of reason, as ambiguous as they often are, in 
view. This view involves turning on its head 
the Platonic dictum that philosophers should 
be leaders and to claim instead that citizens 
should be philosophers in the sense that they 
all, we all, carry a commitment to reason 
together in the deep humility of inquiry. Until 
citizens are philosophic in this sense, our 
political decision-making will be doomed to 
a kind of power struggle. The aim of teach-
ing philosophy should be that of working to a 
new view of citizenship as an engagement in 
political inquiry. 
MRD: Thinking about philosophical citizen-
ship, it seems that much of your work tries 
to navigate how we deal with those things 
that sit at the margins of public rationality 
(pseudoscience, moral evil, the inner voice 
of conscience, disagreement about the basic 
criteria for rationality itself, etc.). But in your  
latest work on probability (“Beyond the 
Magical Thinking Behind the Principal 
Principle”), you seem to be challenging a basic 
feature of rationality by showing that project-
ing probabilities based on past experience 
cannot be entirely justified in independent 
grounds. Could you explain what you are  
doing in this work, and how it connects to  
your broader concerns?
EJ: My more recent work on applied probabil-
ity continues my exploration of the strengths 
and limits of reason. The strength of prob-
ability is that it does (or should) guide us in our 
daily activities, but, and now a limit, it does 
not apply to any particular single case. At first 
glance this appears contradictory: probability 
guides us, it does not apply in the single case, 
and yet we act in the single case. A good 
deal of scholarly work has tried to show that 
probability does apply to the single case, work 
that I argue does not succeed. For probability 
is confirmed or disconfirmed by extended 
observations of sequences or aggregate. To 
claim, for example, that there is a 40% chance 
of rain under these conditions is an ellipti-
cal way of saying that in the long run it rains 
around 40% of the time in these conditions. 
Hence, to apply probability to the single case, 
to say that the 40% applies to this case is to 
infer a property of the part, the single case, 
from the property of the whole, the aggregate 
or sequence. In thinking this way, we fall 
prey to the fallacy of division, of mistakenly 
thinking that a property of the whole must be 
a property of its parts. 
MRD: How then should we use probability to 
guide us? 
EJ: First, we need to be very clear that when 
we speak of the probability of a single case 
we are really speaking of a long-range projec-
tion: all we know, if we’ve got the long-range 
distribution right, is that the type of event, in 
this case rain, will hover around that distri-
bution. Hence, when we make a bet on a 
probability distribution (that is, let probability 
guide us), our bet should be long-term, where 
we ask ourselves whether we can stay the 
course in the long run. Second, what of single 
cases that are “one offs,” that don’t repeat 
themselves? What of an operation, say, where 
we are told by the surgeon that we have very 
good chances of coming through it? Here, 
there is no staying the course for us, for we 
will, hopefully, meet this case but once. What 
we want is just what we don’t have: probabil-
ity applying here and now, the gods of chance 
working on our behalf. Nor do we have what 
the surgeon has: a long-run projection that 
she lives through, knowing that most cases 
over the long haul will hover around these 
good odds. We, on the other hand, face “one 
offs.” All we can do in these circumstances, 
I argue, is bundle the many cases of similar 
probabilities - the “good odds” of crossing the 
street at a busy intersection, the good odds of 
it not raining on our picnic - into one long-run 
projection. What we know, then, is that the 
long-run projection, even if we’ve got it right, 
will come out bad in some of these cases and 
we can’t pick the cases. 
MRD: For me, one upshot of this critique is 
that we must confront the inevitable place of 
luck in our lives. 
EJ: Precisely! Those of us who have had 
“successful” lives, to my mind, too readily take 
more credit (and spread more blame) than 
is deserved. While we might have made all 
the right decisions, in the end, the fact that 
those decisions came out “right” was part and 
parcel of a bundled probabilistic distribution. 
All we can hope is that our good odds play out 
in the matters that really count and that when 
our plans do work out, we are more grateful 
than proud. 
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